# 1AC – UCO

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#### The heart of the resolution reveals a junction whereby reliance on rational economic calculus and competition has fluidly infiltrated social spaces, reifying economism as an objective mode of governance.

Jessop 15 – Prof of Sociology at Lancaster University [Bob Jessop, The course, contradictions, and consequences of extending competition as a mode of (meta-)governance: towards a sociology of competition and its limits, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory Volume 16, 2015 - Issue 2: A sociology of competition, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1600910X.2015.1028418]

The governance of competition This section adds two further perspectives. One is the regulation or governance of competition from the idealized viewpoint of its role as a public good. Suspending judgement for the moment on whether perfect competition is really possible, this approach does have a rational kernel, namely, the interest of capital in general, as opposed to particular capitals, in securing a level playing field. The realities of differential accumulation suggest that the competition policies and their effects merit at the very least a sceptical interrogation. The other perspective involves a radical ideological critique of discourses about competition and competitiveness as direct principles of governance. This is because competition is so heterogeneous and complex a process that most, if not all, efforts to make it a principle of governance must rest on serious cognitive and normative simplification, if not fetishism and ideological mystification. Two useful entry-points here are the competition state and competition law. Although ‘competition’ figures in both, its respective connotations illustrate the polyvalence of the concept and the complexities of its referent. Whereas competition (or anti-trust) law attempts to regulate competition, the competition state attempts to promote competitiveness. Competition law draws mainly on orthodox analyses of (perfect) competition and/or on institutional analyses of contestable markets (e.g. in the law and economics movement). It prioritizes micro-economic competition and may be supplemented by efforts to remove or control tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (extending into questions of new constitutionalism, and so on). In contrast, the competition state draws on ‘the other canon’, i.e. heterodox analyses of competition that justify strategies and policies to promote competitiveness at various scales from micro- through meso- and macro- to meta-competitiveness. Paradoxically perhaps, many policies pursued by competition states (e.g. in the field of industrial policy) might well be ruled illegal according to the principles of competition law. The two aspects can be linked to the extent that states promote competition law for the sake of enhancing national or regional competitiveness (on the case of the European Union's ‘competition for competitiveness strategy’ in this regard, see Wigger 2008). Competition law I examine this from three aspects. One is the complexities of its object. If these are neglected, regulatory failure is likely to be blamed on the design of competition law rather than the inherent ungovernability of its object. This poses interesting questions for competition law that are also reflected in the contrasting traditions of US anti-trust law (now weakened by the growing influence of the Chicagoan ‘law and economics’ movement) and the Continental European tradition, which still owes something to Ordoliberalism despite the growing integration of the world market in the shadow of neo-liberalism (for evidence of a partial convergence within the EU towards the US model with, however, continuing US–EU differences regarding global competition policy more generally, see Wigger 2008; and Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2010). For example, first, should competition law aim to govern competitive behaviour in dynamic markets or to secure the conditions for perfect competition? And how has the balance between these goals changed as competition and anti-trust law have changed over the years? A second aspect is the place of competition law as one among several means through which economic and political forces seek to design modes of regulation to promote the accumulation of some capitals at the expense of others. The third aspect concerns the problems of governing competition alongside boosting competitiveness in an increasingly integrated world market. Traditionally, competition law seeks to regulate micro-economic competitiveness, i.e. competition in the structure and behaviour of firms. This is often measured in terms of market share, profits, and growth rates. An extensive managerial and industrial economics literature argues that ‘firm-specific advantages’ (factors that are unavailable in the short term to competing firms) are crucial to such competitiveness and, indeed, underpin monopolistic competition. They might originate in factors of production (patent rights, know-how, R&D capacity) or marketing capacity (design, image, knowledge of likely demand, sales networks). They can also derive from extra-legal or illegal activities (e.g. predatory pricing, political deals, mafia-like conduct). This is the primary site of the conflict between individual capitals’ search for super-profits at the expense of other firms and the interest of capital in general in conditions that create an average profit rate, an average rate of interest, and so on. Competition law tends to operate with a relatively static notion of competition centred on the formation of market prices. But, as an actual rather than idealized process, competition is inherently disequilibrating and, in Schumpeterian guise, creatively destructive. The latter matters especially in periods when a previously dominant productive technology and/or associated forms of finance and enterprise are displaced by another technology and its accompaniments (cf. Perez 2002). Such transitions tend to disrupt competition law, which lags behind changes in products, processes, marketing, sourcing, and corporate organization. Whereas a particular system of competition law can weather relatively minor disruptions and crises, ruptural transitions between long waves of development tend to trigger a search for a new regulatory system. World market integration has its own effects. It is reflected in the growing transnationalization of competition law (Gerber 2010) and the growth of new, state-centred structures of ‘global competition law’ (Dowdle 2013). These include transnational networks among national competition agencies; treaties affecting state-level responsibilities for implementing competition policy; and inter-state arrangements for transnational enforcement of national competition law. Efforts to regulate competition are further complicated by the many bases for competitiveness considered as a set of real capacities/powers. In this regard there is typically a specific hierarchy of forms of competition and competitive players, and, as this alters, the dynamics of competition also change. Among relevant changes are: (1) the relative importance of different markets in setting the parameters of competition; (2) the relative super- and subordination of forms of competition; and (3) the types of firm associated with advantage in given fields of competition. Not all of the factors shaping these hierarchies can be regulated by competition law. In addition to market relations, for example, competitive advantages are pursued to boost profits of enterprise within corporations. Such actions exemplify ‘dynamic allocative efficiency’, a form of competition that is hard to regulate through competition law (cf. Graham and Smith 2004).4 Moreover, not only does competition occur between economic actors (for example, firms, strategic alliances, networks) but also between political entities representing specific spaces and places (for example, cities, regions, nations, triads). The expanding world market and plurality of states create further regulatory problems, regarding, for example, the role of international private law, how to handle conflicts of laws, and the reach of extraterritoriality. Competition and competitiveness also depend on extra-economic as well as economic conditions, capacities, and competencies. Thus, if competition is hard to regulate through law, how can it govern the factors making for the ‘competitiveness’? At best, regulators can identify a subset of interactions among profit-oriented economic agents, isolate them as an object of regulation or governance, and seek to govern them through the development of appropriate rules, regulations, agencies, mechanisms, and institutions (all steps being contested). But many sources of competitive and anti-competitive behaviour remain beyond the reach of competition law. This is one of the sources of market and regulatory failure. The competition state Definitions and discourses of competition and competitiveness date back centuries and have different implications for state action. Mercantilist notions from the seventeenth century tied to state policies to control trade and increase financial reserves can be contrasted with 1890s imperialism oriented to state enclosure of territory for military-political as well as geo-economic goals. With the transition to a more liberal post-war order (in the shadow of US hegemony), competition focused more on domestic growth and multinational foreign investment, leading to conflicts between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism (Ostry and Nelson 1995). Likewise, with the rise of the current neo-liberal transnational financial order and with the theoretical and policy interest in a globalizing knowledge-based economy, competition has refocused on innovation (including in finance and securitization) and in how best to link extra-economic factors to the ‘demands' of economic competition. Different framings of competition and competitiveness involve different forms of action with uneven impacts on the positioning of firms, sectors, regions, nations, and continents, as well as on the balance of economic and political forces in and beyond the state system. Moreover, many leading firms and banks are transnational in operation, with complex internal divisions of labour and complex forms of embedding into global production chains and financial flows that may nonetheless be regarded as important for national or bloc competitiveness, especially where they have significant bases in a national state (contrast the USA and European Union). Once competitiveness is accepted as a real phenomenon that varies across scales of economic (and extra-economic) organization and affects capacities to compete in a world market characterized by a stratified terrain of competition, uneven development, centre-periphery relations, and so on, it can become the target of strategies and policies to enhance, neutralize, or weaken competitive capacities. This is reflected in the developmental state (oriented to catch-up competitiveness) and the more general form of the competition state. Broadly defined, the latter is a state that aims to secure growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions currently deemed vital for success in economic competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states. Paradoxically, offshore, more peripheral national economies also become an element in competition, in so far as they can be sponsored (or tolerated) by states to secure competitive advantages for domestic or international capitals based in their own territories (such as via transnational supply chains) (Palan 1998; Urry 2014). As such the competition state prioritizes strategies to create, restructure, or reinforce – as far as this is economically and politically feasible – the competitive advantages of its territory, population, built environment, social institutions, and economic agents. The same idea is sometimes expressed in the notion of ‘entrepreneurial state’, which is more closely associated with Schumpeterian views on competitive advantage, promoting ‘sunrise’ technologies, industries, and other cutting-edge innovations. This has been extended to support for financial innovation (including, tacitly, ‘criminnovation’) to secure competitive advantage – sometimes linked to a regulatory race to the bottom (which London has won vis-à-vis New York). Just as there are different forms of competition, so too are there different forms of developmental, competition, or entrepreneurial state (for the second, these include neo-liberal, dirigiste, and social democratic competition states: see Cerny 1997; Jessop 2002). Although developmental and competition states have been studied primarily at the national level, this is not justified by the historical and contemporary record. Since the fifteenth century, catch-up competitiveness has been pursued at different scales from the city through regions and provinces to national states and international or supranational blocs (imperial blocs, the capitalist and communist camps, the European Union, etc.). In turn, these state strategies to develop ‘laggard’ economies have met resistance by more advanced states that seek to maintain their advantages by promoting free trade (Reinert 2008). In short, although the ‘developmental’, ‘competition', and ‘entrepreneurial state’ are new concepts, significant historical analogues have guided state policy at different scales for almost 600 years. Unsurprisingly, a wide range of factors has been identified in different economic imaginaries, theoretical and policy paradigms, and at different times as relevant to competitiveness. In the 1980s, for example, the OECD listed these factors: ‘the size of domestic markets, the structure of domestic production, relationships between different sectors and industries … the distribution and market power of supplier firms … the characteristics and size distribution of buyers, and the efficiency of non-market relations between firms and production units’. Other factors included: ‘no exaggerated conflict in the field of income distribution, price stability, flexibility, and the adaptability of all participants in the market … a balanced economic structure based on small, medium-sized, and big companies … the acceptance of new technology, favourable scientific and technological infrastructure and realistic requirements for risk containment and environmental protection’ (OECD 1986, 91–2; cf. Esser et al. 1998; Pedersen 2011; and Campbell and Pedersen 2007). Because of the importance attached to structural, systemic, institutional, or societal competitiveness, economic competition expands to become a virtual competition between social worlds. This increases pressures to valorize a wide range of institutions and social relations that were previously regarded as extra-economic. One consequence is that hard economic calculation increasingly rests on the mobilization of soft social resources that are both irreducible to the economic and resistant to such calculation. Recent examples include ‘social capital’, ‘social trust’, ‘collective learning’, ‘institutional thickness’, ‘untraded interdependencies’, ‘local amenities’, the knowledge base, the ‘triple helix’ of business-university-local state interactions, and even ‘culture’. Such discourses are linked to rapid growth in (competing!) benchmarking exercises and in associated commercial services to construct league tables and recommend how to enhance or manipulate scores. Although state strategies may target specific places, spaces, and scales and even be directed against particular competitors, these efforts are always mediated through the operation and audit of the world market as a whole. This extends the importance of the three main forms of capitalist competition: reducing socially necessary labour time, socially necessary turnover time, and the naturally necessary (re)production times of nature (e.g. plants, animals, raw materials), both as a source of wealth and, if commodified, source of surplus value. It also extends the importance of extra-economic factors bearing on competitiveness and profitability: in addition to those illustrated above, we can add tax competition, regulatory arbitrage, offshoring, and so on. Moreover, following Weber's account of political capitalism, we could also include measures to promote competition through force and domination, unusual deals with political authority, lobbying for favourable, anti-competitive legislation, ‘de-supervision’, and de-criminalization (on the two last-mentioned, see Black 2005, 2011). 6. Competition as a mode of governance According to Polanyi, the ‘economistic fallacy’ describes all economies in terms of categories that are actually unique to the (capitalist) market economy and explains all economic activities in terms of maximizing behaviour. This fallacy is seen in the neo-classical theoretical tendency to strip commodities (and fictitious commodities) of their specific properties and assume that they can all be organized in the same way along competitive lines to produce efficient market outcomes (Alam 2014). It is also seen in the liberal and neo-liberal tendency to focus on the exchange-value rather than use-value aspects of commodities and fictitious commodities. For example, the wage is seen as a cost of production rather than source of demand, and capital is seen as a sum of (credit-)money for investment in any asset anywhere rather than as a stock of assets to be valorized in a particular time-space (for further examples, see Jessop 2010). This tends in turn to produce such powerful tensions and crisis tendencies in capitalist market economies that, as Polanyi observes, ‘society’ eventually fights back against their environmentally and socially destructive effects. Neglecting this set of problems is the basis for extending market and competitive principles into the operations of the state and civil society where they cannot be privatized. Different principles of governance seem more or less well-suited to different stages and forms of capitalism. These may have distinctive economic and political imaginaries and institutional attractors (or centres of gravity) around which regulatory or governance principles oscillate. This is reflected in successive generations of the comparative capitalism literature from the German historical school to recent work on varieties of capitalism. A key issue here is whether changes in governance practices reflect economic and political imaginaries more than structural complementarities or result from their interaction in a dialectics of path-shaping and path-dependency. A recent test case for exploring this issue is the crisis of finance-dominated accumulation and the switch from the celebration of ‘more market, less state’ to quite exceptional and unprecedented forms of state intervention to restore the momentum of neo-liberal reforms and to rescue failed finance-dominated accumulation regimes. Exchange based on the anarchy of the market or quasi-market arrangements is one of the four principal modes of governance in complex societies. The others are: command based on hierarchy; heterarchic networks and partnerships; and solidarity based on unconditional commitments. Hybrid forms also exist. Historically all four have coexisted, albeit with varying weight across different social fields and across space-time. Neo-liberalism privileges the market and, above all, (capitalist) market competition as a principle of governance even more than liberalism. It advocates liberalization, deregulation, and privatization and introduces market proxies in those social areas, in the state, public sphere, and ‘civil society’, where profit-oriented, market-mediated principles based on the commodity form, price form, and money form are absent and, in addition, deemed inappropriate. This prompts the neo-liberal search for functional equivalents to these principles and their associated forms. Whereas the 1960s and 1970s saw the high-point in advanced capitalism of the discourses and practices of planning and productivity, the 1980s marked a turn towards markets and flexibility. Driven by neo-liberal regime shifts (with New Zealand being the most radical exemplar), increasing emphasis was placed on counteracting state failure by redrawing the boundaries between government and market and, for the residual public sector, engaging in ‘administrative recommodification’ (Offe 1984). This was expressed in the development of market governance (where the state designs, creates, monitors, and polices a market to fulfil a public purpose – for example, though the issue of vouchers to be spent in a competitive market) and the rise of ‘new public management’ and, in the USA, a movement for ‘reinventing government’ (cf. Donahue and Nye 2002; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Peters 2001). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) identify a common trend in this regard in advanced capitalist economies. In broad terms, this posits that the public sector can be improved by importing business concepts, techniques, and values. More specifically, it comprises a ‘bundle of specific concepts and practices’. These include: (1) greater emphasis on ‘performance’, especially through the measurement of outputs; (2) a preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational forms over large, multi-functional forms; (3) substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations as the main co-ordinating device; (4) a widespread injection of market-type mechanisms including competitive tendering, public sector league tables, and performance-related pay; and (5) an emphasis on treating service users as ‘customers’ and on the application of generic quality improvement techniques such as total quality management. These authors also note that this bundle of specific concepts and practices has two variants: a ‘hard’ form that relies on rational systems of control based on measurement, rewards, and penalties to ‘make managers manage’; and a ‘soft’ form that ‘lets managers manage’ by enabling creative leadership, entrepreneurship, and cultural change oriented to customer service. In both cases, this approach tends to fail. For, as Offe noted over 20 years earlier, whereas capitalist enterprises have a clear formal maximand that is easily measured in monetary terms (profit maximization), governments have confused, often inconsistent, and sometimes clearly contradictory substantive goals that are politically contested and hard to quantify, sometimes deliberately so (Offe 1975). In addition, the one-sided neo-liberal focus on the exchange-value and value aspects of economic calculation leads to neglect of the substantive use-value aspects that are equally necessary to capital accumulation (see above). Attempts to address the use-value aspects of private, public, and third-sector goods and services have been made through developing multidimensional, substantive mission-oriented targets, performance prisms, ‘balanced scorecards’, and the like (cf. Niven 2010). In the private sector, these measures were often used as leading indicators of future financial performance (thereby reinforcing the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated accumulation) (Pidd 2012). In the public sector, they are constrained by budget cuts, demands for regular ‘efficiency gains’, and a shift towards enduring austerity and fiscal consolidation. This tends to undermine the balanced approach. The high-point of neo-liberalism and new public management occurred in the early 1990s as neo-liberal regime shifts were being consolidated and before the limits of ‘more market, less state’ become glaringly evident. This led to recognition that the formula of ‘disaggregation + competition + incentivization’ (Dunleavy et al. 2006) was leading to fragmented, incoherent outcomes conducted by too many arms-length and unaccountable agencies in the private, public, and third sectors that needed to be reconnected through ‘joined up government’ or ‘governance in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994; Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Meuleman 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In terms of administrative theory and practice this prompted interest in ‘meta-governance’, that is, the governance of governance. Substantively, it stimulated interest in ‘Third Way’ efforts to create flanking and supporting mechanisms to soften the impact of neo-liberalism and enhance its legitimacy while sustaining its transformative momentum. As evidence has mounted in the last two decades that each form of governance has its own forms of governance failure, attention has turned theoretically and practically from concern with specific forms of governance to efforts at meta-governance. This involves the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy, networks, and solidarity to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those engaged in meta-governance (Dunsire 1996; Jessop 1998; Kooiman 1993; Scott 2006). Governments have a key role to play here, but even this kind of ‘meta-governance’ is fallible. The emerging system is a complex, multi-scalar, hybrid, and tangled system of meta-governance. Yet the very complexity of the interweaving of forms of governance and government on different scales means that the resulting system is more complex than any state, or political or social entity, can understand, and its overall evolution lies beyond the control of a state or its society. This is evident, as indicated above, in the actions of the competition state and the limits of competition law. It also means that, compared to more traditional forms of state organization, based on constitutional law and public accountability, meta-governance, even when conducted in the shadow of hierarchy, is ineffably ungraspable and intransparent and, as such, inherently unaccountable. A post-bureaucratic and post-democratic political system in which competition becomes the governing principle and market completion on a world scale is the ultimate goal is a dystopian future. 7. Conclusions General Stanley McChrystal, commenting about an offensive to retake territory controlled by the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, declared, hubristically: We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in.5 For some 20 years we have been experiencing and witnessing the consequences of the naïve neo-liberal belief that ‘we've got competition in a box, ready to roll out’. In both cases, these consequences can be described in terms of ‘blowback’ (Johnson 2004). This article has addressed the effects of the fetishization of competition as a principle of societal organization and its role in subordinating society to the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated accumulation. It began by noting the polyvalence of the ‘market economy’ (commercial economy, market economy, capitalist economy, financialized economy, finance-dominated economy) and the extent to which this could be exploited in efforts to legitimate neo-liberal financialization and the drive towards a finance-dominated accumulation regime that extends markets and capitalist (and even financialized) market proxies into areas where they tend to be far more creatively destructive than destructively creative. For competition has a formal, procedural rationality suitable for supplying standardized private goods and services (and even then is prone to unplanned disruption through Schumpeterian innovations) and is less rational, even in its own economistic terms, when dealing with customized commodities (where competition has not yet established socially necessary labour and turnover times) and/or where goods and services have strong elements of common pool resources or public goods. Competition is even less suited to the production and reproduction of the four categories of fictitious commodities and the supply of goods and services that advance human flourishing. It was also argued that simple governance solutions to complex problems do not work and are especially inappropriate where there are multiple substantive goals that are hard to specify consistently, let alone measure in terms of a single metric. In this context, the rolling out of competition as a principle of regulation and governance has actually been just one in a repeated succession of attempts to overcome government and governance failure by turning to another mode of governance – which is equally doomed to fail, albeit in its own distinctive ways. The growing unaccountability of capitalist market forces and their tendency to generalize and intensify the contradictions and crisis tendencies inherent in the capital relation make it imperative – but also increasingly hard – to reclaim some measure of democratic accountability in material provisioning and the care economy by limiting markets to areas where the invisible hand works well, and restricting and regulating it where it produces substantively irrational results for humankind and the planet.

#### That machination is not neutral but demonstrates how economic redistribution through antitrust as burnishing the logic of *terra nullius*---the evacuation and clearing of Indigenous presence from the land to enable genocidal plunder

Arruda 16 – Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto [James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics” <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>]

A particular tragedy and contradiction in mainstream economics is its manufactured background story. The presuppositions underlying the narrative of the discipline generally mirror a biased worldview; in general, that of an isolated individual performing rational (optimizing) decisions within a closed system (Pratten, 2007; 2004). Feminist economists argue that this model individual is also white, colonial, male11 (Grappard, 1995). The story of individuals constantly taking selfish and rational decisions within a closed world informs the methodology used by economists. With a narrow experience of life, the constructed nature of existence (ontology) inscribed within mainstream economics generates unreliable knowledge production tools (epistemology) about the economy—a complex system in which collectives of individuals live and exchange with each other. Furthermore, mainstream economics epistemology employs mathematical and deductivist tools. Critical realism12 argues that economics’ deductivist methodology is only appropriate to study a ‘small-closed-world’ system (Pratten, 1996; Spash, 2012). All in all, economic event regularities are deduced from an unreasonable and unrealistic ontology. For the Cambridge Journal of Economics co-editor Stephen Pratten (2007), the only path beyond mainstream economics is through the abandonment of the deductivist framework. This is a call for a complete epistemological revolution! I believe that to delegitimize institutions, their stories have to be delegitimized. If mathematical-deduction uses prior beliefs/stories to explain the past and predict the future, then a critical reformulation of economics ontology is absolutely required as well, but not sufficient. My ontological investigation of the discipline is inspired and drawn from revolutionary Indigenous feminist theorists. For instance, in I am Woman, Lee Maracle (1996) of the Sto:Loh nation pointedly argues that (mainstream) economics and mathematics are products of white (European) settler male worldviews. As a matter of fact, the latter character’s beliefs and experiences of the world are also at the root of mainstream economics ontology, and a catalyst for its form of knowledge production. My analytical focus is also informed by my Settler space of birth occupying Kanien’kehá:ka territory. It is also informed by my present space and (white settler male) character occupying the land protected by and shared between the Anishinaabe, Mississauga, and Haudenosaunee people, as per the Dish With One Spoon treaty. In this paper, I argue that the definitions of land13, wealth and economics in Canadian mainstream economics textbooks depict a Settler colonial ontology. Thesis Land. Wealth. Economics. These three interdependent words connect how we see and act in the world. In my opinion, land is loving, abundant, intelligent, and always remembers. Land encompasses a long list of wealth; life, resources, knowledge, stories. Land is wealth. Logically and ethically, an appropriate system of wealth exchange (an economy) can only be prosperous if it respectfully relies on land. An appropriate study of economics interlaces our material relationships with each other, with more-than-humans14 and with life all together. Yet, it is not sufficient to build a better economic way to relate to the land, while Settler institutions occupy Indigenous land and territories. Different forces of power are at play within the Settler colonial complex. In general, there are three ‘structures of invasion’: spaces, systems and stories. In Settler Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Barker and Lowman (2015) refer to these structures as they delve into the construction of Settlers in Canada. They elaborate on the types of Settler colonial invasions performed in Canada, which reinforce Settler power and authority over the land. In all instances, the spaces we15 take, the systems we build, and the stories we tell “are [ultimately] focused on the land” (Barker & Lowman, 2015, p. 31). First of all, ‘spaces’ as a structure of invasion is defined as the Settler colonial spaces that displace and replace Indigenous places (Barker et al., 2015). For example, the city of Toronto is a Settler colonial space since it intentionally covers and displaces Anishnaabe spaces. Second of all, ‘systems’ are constructed so that Settler colonialism can assert and develop itself (Barker & Lowman, 2015). The Indian Residential School system was a system that severed the ties of young Indigenous children from the land. Thirdly, the ‘stories’ created by Settlers to legitimize occupation, such as the ‘Peacemaker Myth’ and ‘Terra Nullius’, displaces Indigenous stories of land connection (Barker & Lowman, 2015). In the case of mainstream economics, the most relevant structures of invasion are the stories and systems it creates. Economic stories and systems that dismiss and replace Indigenous relations to land thus intentionally participate in the displacement and erasure of Indigenous spaces, systems and stories. Canadian economics textbooks regard land as given for free by nature (to Settlers) and (initially) without any agency16 to generate wealth, until Settlers improve and value the land. In other words, economics students assume that before the European arrival on (what is now commonly known as) North America, nature gave the land to the European Settlers—metaphorically understood, of course. All of nature’s contents was devoid of agency, and thus free for the new visitors (Settlers) to claim, to own. Completely ignoring wealth accumulation from land, the theoretical framework in Canadian economics textbooks does not question wealth distribution and mostly focuses on wealth production (see Green, 2013). Of course, wealth distribution and production occurs on land. Canadian economists nonetheless assume that all economic activities—in this case, production and distribution of wealth—begin on free and unoccupied land, transforming their respective spaces/locations (land) into improvable and privatized assets, ready for the (free) market. A Canadian definition of economics that does not encompass its socio-political (colonial) context is a structure that legitimizes Settler colonial invasion, against Indigenous peoples and their land. As such, young students who read, learn and interpret the world from Canadian economics textbooks do not face their complicity within Settler colonialism. Rather, they confidently reproduce their economic knowledge on unceded/stolen land. All in all, the underlying thesis of this chapter is that the constructed paradigm within Canadian standard economics textbooks derives from the imagination of a privileged and ahistorical Settler position of ‘objectivism’ and ‘authority’, camouflaged by Whiteness, by an empty ontology, and by storytelling derived from the dominant White Settler Male view.

#### Settler colonialism is embedded within research methodologies which are demanded by both the resolution and debates relationship to research-making. That marks a structural inquiry centered on accumulating “objective knowledge” and makes Native communities the hunting grounds of “objective” academic social science, cementing settler colonialism’s purported inevitability.

Tuck and Yang 14 [Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Unbecoming claims: Pedagogies of refusal in qualitative research." Qualitative Inquiry 20.6 (2014): 811-818.] \*edited for gendered language

Settler colonial studies seek to understand the particular features of settler colonialism, and how its shapes and contours of domination (like that in the United States, the context from which we write but also Canada, New Zealand, Israel, Chinese Tibet, and Australia) differ from other forms of coloniality. Invasion is a structure, not (just) an event in time (Wolfe, 1999). In settler colonial contexts, land is the ultimate pursuit: Settlers arrive in a new (to them) place and claim it as theirs. They destroy and then later erase (via assimilation or cultural strangling) Indigenous peoples, and use weapons and policy to extinguish their/our claims to land. Settlement requires the labor of chattel slaves and guest workers, who must be kept landless and estranged from their homelands. The settlers locate themselves at the top and at the center of all typologies—as simultaneously most superior and most normal. Because land is the ultimate pursuit, settler colonialism involves a daedal arrangement of justifications and unhistories to deny genocide and brutality. Settler colonialism must cover its tracks, and does so by making its structuring natural, inevitable, invisible, and immutable (Tuck & Yang, 2012; Veracini, 2011). Inquiry as invasion is a result of the imperative to produce settler colonial knowledge and to produce it for the academy. This invasion imperative is often disguised in universalist terms of producing “objective knowledge” for “the public.” It is a thin disguise, as most research rhetoric waxes the poetics of empire: to discover, to chart new terrain, to seek new frontiers, to explore, and so on. The academy’s unrelenting need to produce “original research” is what makes the inquiry an invading structure, not an event. Social science hunts for new objects of study, and its favored reaping grounds are Native, urban, poor, and Othered communities. In related writing, we presented three axioms of social science research that ground our analysis of the need for refusal to inquiry as invasion. The axioms are as follows: (I) The subaltern can speak, but is only invited to speak her/our pain. Drawing from bell hooks’ (1990) observation that the academy fetishizes stories of the violated, we note that what passes for subaltern “voice” in research is a commodified pain narrative: “No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story.” (p. 343) (II) There are some forms of knowledge that the academy doesn’t deserve. This axiom is the crux of refusal. The university is not universal; rather, it is a colonial collector of knowledge as another form of territory. There are stories and experiences that already have their own place, and placing them in the academy is removal, not respect. (III) Research may not be the intervention that is needed. This axiom challenges the latent theory of change that research— more academic knowing—will somehow innately contribute to the improvement of tribes, communities, youth, schools, etc. All three axioms gesture toward what lives beyond the paradigm of research—voice, knowledge, interventions— and ought to be kept out of reach. As researchers, when we overhear, uncover, are entrusted with narratives that we know will sell, do we stop the sale?

#### That cannot be delinked from settler institutions – the settler state is driven by the logic of elimination – the primal drive to expansion that materializes native land dispossession, displacement, and genocide – it cannot be contingent – settler societies establish the structure of invasion through the will-to-possession and structural occupation of indigenous land

Rifkin 14 – Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro [Mark, ‘Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,’ pp. 7-10]

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness functions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix).

#### Debate marks the archival accumulation of settler colonial patterns of research-making. Debaters are archivists, and the curation of the archive is and was never insulated---research is not owned, it becomes echoed across social contexts and complicates ethical stances with or against settler colonialism. We control the only tangible impact – learning is an iterative process that can be disrupted

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Settler colonization trains people to see each other, the land, and knowledge as property, to be in constant insatiable competition for limited resources. For the vantage of the settler, the focus becomes maintaining those property rights, and all others are positioned in relative locations around that center, being erased from visibility or antithetically supporting the settler center while never being able to achieve its status. But even a cursory understanding of cognition, culture, and consciousness tells us that, as Bakhtin (1986) theorized, our ideas, our words, have all been said before. He put it like this: Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to preceding utterances of the given sphere [we understand the word ‘response’ here in the broadest sense]. Each utterance refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account ... . Therefore, each kind of utterance is filled with various kinds of responsive reactions to other utterances of the given sphere of speech communication. (91) Bakhtin meant response not only in the literal sense of what was just uttered before, but in a much farther-reaching sense, including people near and far in myriad contexts. Responses involve speakers and listeners. There is an answerability in the roles we have with each other. How we interact is not just about that specific moment and context, but echoes across contexts. It’s related to poststructural feminist theorizations of subjectivity (e.g., Ahmed 2006; Grosz 1994), in that the ways that we come into being in space and time, how we carry ourselves and act, are dynamic mixtures of affordances that have been shaped by and echo longstanding yet not sealed histories (Gordon 1994). Our social locations and histories have an impact on not just what we say but how we say it, and what meanings are made of our utterances. Considering educational research’s role in the perpetuation of settler-slave-Indigenous relationships, those of us employed as educational researchers are answerable to these deep trajectories. Given these deep trajectories, research and researchers who have succeeded, have been validated through settler colonial structures of schooling and, consequentially, also have contributed to creating a science that reflects misunderstandings about race, class, and gender (Jordan-Young 2011). Educational researchers must, as one example, answer to ways in which the field has allowed for learning to be lost in the pursuit of test score-driven achievement. Answerability means that we have responsibilities as speakers, listeners, and those responsibilities include stewardship of ideas and learning, not ownership. As educational researchers, how can we become and stay fundamentally answerable to the core endeavor of learning, not test score production or unachievable achievement in a stratified society? Learning, like all practices, is conducted in context so cannot be seen as a cordoned off space that is not subject to settler colonial relations. Rather, learning is fundamentally about coming into being and altering that being; in other words, it is a subjective act. Coming into being is, in essence, about being-in-relation. Therefore, the study, theorizing, and praxis of learning is the space our integrity should hold and where it has, instead, shown the most discipline-specific manifestations of settler colonialism. How educational research serves learning provides a place to more fully embody decolonial stances, as it has the potential to materially alter how educational research is conducted and for what purposes. I propose a repositioning toward learning, an alteration of researching bodies in places. For this, I must draw on work largely outside educational research. In her study of the places of learning found in media, architecture, and pedagogy, Ellsworth (2005) draws attention to the fundamentally transitional space that is learning. Rather than how the tradition of schooling has materially designed conditions for the transmittal and disciplined mimicry of expert knowledge, and educational research has, in turn and in cahoots, truncated learning to be measureable achievement, meant to be predicted, Ellsworth encourages the reader to think about the conditions that make learning possible but still unpredictable. She follows the traditions of thinkers like Grosz (1995), Massumi (1995), and Winnicott (1989), who attend to the social self as one in constant motion, constantly reconfiguring itself, learning, in relation to time, space, and materiality. She wrote: Learning never takes place in the absence of bodies, emotions, place, time, sound, image, self-experience, history. It always detours through memory, forgetting, desire, fear, pleasure, surprise, rewriting. And because learning takes place in relation, its detours take us up to and sometimes across the boundaries of habit, recognition, and the socially constructed identities within our selves. (Ellsworth 2005, 55) Through several examples, Ellsworth draws our attention to, in part, the interior changes involved in spaces designed for pedagogy. For example, in discussing how the Civil Rights Museum in Birmingham sets up exterior conditions for interior alterity, Ellsworth (2005) writes, “Such places of learning implicate bodies in pedagogy in ways that the field of education has seldom explored. As they do this, they encourage and challenge us to move away from understanding the learning self merely through notions of cognition, psychology, or phenomenology or as being subjected to ideology” (6). Core to this framing is learning as a constant becoming and unbecoming, a constant inquiry and coordinate-taking, which sounds a lot like what research is supposed to be. Such a stance opens up spaces to depart from paradigms that theorize freedom, here to learn, as defined relative to restrictions, as in freedom from, but rather freedom as expansive, as in freedom to (Grosz 2010). Learning and knowledge, then, are better approached, particularly in the name of decolonization, as fundamentally quixotic, even wild (Sandoval 2008). Consider another example of learning, also imbued with research, this one from choreography. In 2009, an actor named Gregg Mozgala started to work with choreographer Tamar Rogoff (Genzlinger 2009). Mozgala has cerebral palsy, and Rogoff has no formal understanding of the biology, neuroscience, or physical therapy knowledges of cerebral palsy. But their way of working together and taking cues from his body, rather than working around it, altered deeply his way of being with his body. And what they did was use the principles of research—looking, inquiring, keeping track, and doing it all over again constantly. Like the pauses noted at the start of this article, meaning making and performance was interrupted, slowed down, with observation and bio feedback to return again. This created the space for learning and knowledge production. More specifically, Rogoff introduced Mozgala to a tension-releasing shaking technique. They began doing intensive oneon-one sessions of body work, Ms. Rogoff using her knowledge of the body and dance-training techniques to help Mr. Mozgala find individual bones, muscles, and tendons that he had thought were just collateral damage of the cerebral palsy. Much of this, in the medical field, would be understood to be evidence of neuroplasticity, and although it certainly is, it also speaks fundamentally to what research is. It is contextual, it is about constant coordination of self with other, self within self, and it is in constant motion. I offer these extra-educational examples not to barter in tacit antiintellectualism or to imply that deep, rigorous, discipline-specific study is unimportant, but to promote a radical reconfiguration of being and being-inrelation to knowledge and learning, to foreground “a politics of liberation rather than a politics of recognition” (A. Smith 2010, para 31). If we are to be other than owners invested in settler colonialism, educational research needs a radical restructuring of its relationship to knowledge. Rather than property, we should see knowledge, and more specifically knowledge about learning, as what we are answerable to. We should see ourselves as stewards not of specific pieces of knowledge, but rather of the productive and generative spaces that allow for finding knowledge. To be sure, this is not a new thought or appeal. Much of postmodern and poststructural thought embraces the idea that human practices are much more complex than can be predicted through fine-tuned measurements. Rather, my appeal is that we cease to see the problem in educational research as the lack of application of these ideologies. The problem is not simply one of failure to execute postmodernist or poststructural thought in practice, as these epistemologies do not, in and of themselves, include a critique of the genealogies of coloniality. Interrogating the logics of settler colonialism frees us to counter those logics. It also demands a productively more precise articulation of researcher reflexivity in relation to settler colonial structures. This kind of being-in-relation addresses and destabilizes potentially deterministic readings of settler colonial structures as some being settlers and others not, which in turn runs the danger of locating responsibility to counter coloniality partial rather than pervasive. Spivak (1990) addressed the less useful pauses that some of her White male students expressed when they had come to grips with their social locations, pauses that were more self-serving than answerable to structures of coloniality. She explained: I say to them: ‘Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?’ Then you begin to investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very deterministic position. ... From this position, then, I say you will of course not speak in the same way about the Third World material, but if you make it your task not only to learn what is going on there through language, through specific programmes of study, but also at the same time through a historical critique of your position as the investigating person, then you will see that you have earned the right to criticize, and you will be heard. (62–63).

#### Vote affirmative to engage a stance of refusal that intercedes upon settler colonial research practices by resisting the object-making of research subjects and interrupting the continuation of debate’s settler colonial archive.

#### Refusal is always particular and operates as a mode and framework for desire-based research in both academic and non-academic spaces. Rather than consuming white narratives of economic saviorism, which consolidate settler innocence and the objectification of Native suffering, refusal instead turns settler colonialism into an object of research, de-naturalizing its totalizing western structure.

Tuck & Yang 14 [Eve (Uangax), and Y. Wayne, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” Humanizing Research (2014): <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>] DH

The Erased Lynching series yields another context in which we might consider what a social scientist’s refusal stance might comprise. Though indeed centering on the erasure of the former object, refusal need not be thought of as a subtractive methodology. Refusal prompts analysis of the festive spectators regularly backgrounded in favor of wounded bodies, strange fruit, interesting scars. Refusal shifts the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments—in this case, the lynch mob, which does not disappear when the lynching is over, but continues to live, accumulating land and wealth through the extermination and subordination of the Other. Thus, refusal helps move us from thinking of violence as an event and toward an analysis of it as a structure. Gonzales-Day might have decided to reproduce and redistribute the images as postcards, which, by way of showing up in mundane spaces, might have effectively inspired reflection on the spectacle of violence and media of terror. However, in removing the body and the ropes, he installed limits on what the audience can access, and redirected our gaze to the bodies of those who were there to see a murder take place, and to the empty space beneath the branches. Gonzales-Day introduced a new representational territory, one that refuses to play by the rules of the settler colonial gaze, and one that refuses to satisfy the morbid curiosity derived from settler colonialism’s preoccupation with pain. Refusals are needed for narratives and images arising in social science research that rehumiliate when circulated, but also when, in Simpson’s words, “the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years” (p. 78). As researcher-narrator, Simpson tells us, “I reached my own limit when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the deeply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other Indigenous peoples that they have been mired within anthropologically” (p. 78). Here Simpson makes clear the ways in which research is not the intervention that is needed—that is, the interventions of furthering sovereignty or countering misrepresentations of Native people as anthropological objects. Considering Erased Lynchings dialogically with On Ethnographic Refusal, we can see how refusal is not a prohibition but a generative form. First, refusal turns the gaze back upon power, specifically the colonial modalities of knowing persons as bodies to be differentially counted, violated, saved, and put to work. It makes transparent the metanarrative of knowledge production—its spectatorship for pain and its preoccupation for documenting and ruling over racial difference. Thus, refusal to be made meaningful first and foremost is grounded in a critique of settler colonialism, its construction of Whiteness, and its regimes of representation. Second, refusal generates, expands, champions representational territories that colonial knowledge endeavors to settle, enclose, domesticate. Simpson complicates the portrayals of Iroquois, without resorting to reportrayals of anthropological Indians. Gonzales-Day portrays the violations without reportraying the victimizations. Third, refusal is a critical intervention into research and its circular self-defining ethics. The ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling—its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know, and to defend its violations in the name of “good science.” Refusal challenges the individualizing discourse of IRB consent and “good science” by highlighting the problems of collective harm, of representational harm, and of knowledge colonization. Fourth, refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory. Simpson presents refusal on the part of the researcher as a type of calculus ethnography. Gonzales-Day deploys refusal as a mode of representation. Simpson theorizes refusal by the Kahnawake Nation as anticolonial, and rooted in the desire for possibilities outside of colonial logics, not as a reactive stance. This final point about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler colonial knowledge. Desire is compellingly depicted in Simpson’s description of a moment in an interview, in which the alternative logics about a “feeling citizenship” are referenced. The interviewee states, Citizenship is, as I said, you live there, you grew up there, that is the life that you know—that is who you are. Membership is more of a legislative enactment designed to keep people from obtaining the various benefits that Aboriginals can receive. (p. 76) Simpson describes this counterlogic as “the logic of the present,” one that is witnessed, lived, suffered through, and enjoyed (p. 76). Out of the predicaments, it innovates “tolerance and exceptions and affections” (p. 76). Simpson writes (regarding the Indian Act, or blood quantum), “‘Feeling citizenships’ . . . are structured in the present space of intra-community recognition, affection and care, outside of the logics of colonial and imperial rule” (p. 76). Simpson’s logic of the present dovetails with our discussion on the logics of desire. Collectively, Kahnawake refusals decenter damage narratives; they unsettle the settler colonial logics of blood and rights; they center desire. By theorizing through desire, Simpson thus theorizes with and as Kahnawake Mohawk. It is important to point out that Simpson does not deploy her tribal identity as a badge of authentic voice, but rather highlights the ethical predicaments that result from speaking as oneself, as simultaneously part of a collective with internal disputes, vis-à-vis negotiations of various settler colonial logics. Simpson thoughtfully differentiates between the Native researcher philosophically as a kind of privileged position of authenticity, and the Native researcher realistically as one who is beholden to multiple ethical considerations. What is tricky about this position is not only theorizing with, rather than theorizing about, but also theorizing as. To theorize with and as at the same time is a difficult yet fecund positionality—one that rubs against the ethnographic limit at the outset. Theorizing with (and in some of our cases, as) repositions Indigenous people and otherwise researched Others as intellectual subjects rather than anthropological subjects. Thus desire is an “epistemological shift,” not just a methodological shift (Tuck, 2009, p. 419). CULMINATION At this juncture, we don’t intend to offer a general framework for refusal, because all refusal is particular, meaning refusal is always grounded in historical analysis and present conditions. Any discussion of Simpson’s article would need to attend to the significance of real and representational sovereignty in her analysis and theorizing of refusal. The particularities of Kahnawake sovereignty throb at the center of each of the three dimensions of refusal described above. We caution readers against expropriating Indigenous notions of sovereignty into other contexts, or metaphorizing sovereignty in a way that permits one to forget that struggles to have sovereignty recognized are very real and very lived. Yet from Simpson’s example, we are able to see ways in which a researcher might make transparent the coloniality of academic knowledge in order to find its ethical limits, expand the limits of sovereign knowledge, and expand decolonial representational territories. This is in addition to questions her work helpfully raises about who the researcher is, who the researched are, and how the historical/ representational context for research matters. One way to think about refusal is how desire can be a framework, mode, and space for refusal. As a framework, desire is a counterlogic to the logics of settler colonialism. Rooted in possibilities gone but not foreclosed, “the not yet, and at times, the not anymore” (Tuck, 2010, p. 417), desire refuses the master narrative that colonization was inevitable and has a monopoly on the future. By refusing the teleos of colonial future, desire expands possible futures. As a mode of refusal, desire is a “no” and a “yes.” Another way to think about refusal is to consider using strategies of social science research to further expose the complicity of social science disciplines and research in the project of settler colonialism. There is much need to employ social science to turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon. This form of refusal might include bringing attention to the mechanisms of knowledge legitimation, like the Good Labkeeping Seal of Approval (discussed under Axiom III); contesting appropriation, like the collection of pain narratives; and publicly renouncing the diminishing of Indigenous or local narratives with blood narratives in the name of science, such as in the Havasupai case discussed under Axiom II. As long as the objects of research are presumably damaged communities in need of intervention, the metanarrative of social science research remains unchallenged: which is that research at worst is simply an expansion of common knowledge (and therefore harmless), and that research at best is problem solving (and therefore beneficial). This metanarrative justifies a host of interventions into communities, and treats communities as frontiers to civilize, regardless of the specific conclusions of individual research projects. Consider, for example, wellintended research on achievement gaps that fuels NCLB and testing; the documentation of youth violence that provides the rationales for gang injunctions and the expansion of the prison industrial complex; the documentation of diabetes as justification for unauthorized genomic studies and the expansion of antiIndigenous theories. Instead, by making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of social science research, researchers may bring to a halt or at least slow down the machinery that allows knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life. Thus, this form of refusal might also involve tracking the relationships between social science research and expansions of state and corporate violence against communities. Social science researchers might design their work to call attention to or interrogate power, rather than allowing their work to serve as yet another advertisement for power. Further, this form of refusal might aim to leverage the resources of the academy to expand the representational territories fought for by communities working to thwart settler colonialism. We close this chapter with much left unsaid. This is both because there is so much to say, and also because, as we have noted, all refusal is particular. Refusal understands the wisdom in a story, as well as the wisdom in not passing that story on. Refusal in research makes way for other r-words—for resistance, reclaiming, recovery, reciprocity, repatriation, regeneration. Though understandings of refusal are still emergent, though so much is still coming into view, we want to consolidate a summary of take-away points for our readers. A parting gift, of sorts, as each of us takes our leave to map our next steps as researchers, as community members, within and without academe. We think of this list as a tear-away sheet, something to cut out and carry in your pocket, sew into a prayer flag, or paste into your field notebooks.

#### Refusal is not subtractive, but generative. It establishes a collective limit defined through relational knowledge and care, which upends liberal neutrality that facilitates Black and Native death.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King. “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight.” Critical Ethnic Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2017, pp. 162–185. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162. Accessed 9 Dec. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162.%20Accessed%209%20Dec.%202020).]

In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra- European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson has argued, It has largely gone unnoticed by posthumanists that their queries into ontology often find their homologous (even anticipatory) appearance in decolonial philosophies that confront slavery and colonialism’s inextricability from the Enlightenment humanism they are trying to displace. Perhaps this foresight on the part of decolonial theory is rather unsurprising considering that exigencies of race have crucially anticipated and shaped discourses governing the non- human (animal, technology, object, and plant).12 A crucial point that Jackson emphasizes is that Black and Indigenous studies, particularly decolonial studies, has already grappled with and anticipated the late twentieth- century impulses inspired by Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman to annihilate the self and jettison the future. Indigenous and Black “sex” (as activity, reproduction, pleasure, world- building, and not- human sexuality) are already subsumed by death. For some reason, white critical theory cannot seem to fathom that self- annihilation is something white people need to figure out by themselves. In other words, “they can have that.”13 Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 Simpson shares that Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal. I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which Kahnawakero:non, the “people of Kahnawake,” had refused the authority of the state at almost every turn. The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants.16 The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody does know and talks about it all the time. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)— the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary, Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing.19 In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life.”23